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● A collaborative intrusion detection network in a heterogeneous environment of IDS 
with classification capability was developed. 
● Lower processing time of acquaintance management by the use of a merge risk-
ordered acquaintance selection.   
● High accuracy of intrusion decision based on the IDS acquaintance feedback by the 
use of multi-class risk-cost analysis in the acquaintance selection process. 
 
Abstract. The collaborative intrusion detection network (CIDN) framework 
provides collaboration capability among intrusion detection systems (IDS). 
Collaboration selection is done by an acquaintance management algorithm. A 
recent study developed an effective acquaintance management algorithm by the 
use of binary risk analysis and greedy-selection-sort based methods. However, 
most algorithms do not pay attention to the possibility of wrong responses in multi-
botnet attacks. The greedy-based acquaintance management algorithm also leads 
to a poor acquaintance selection processing time when there is a high number of 
IDS candidates. The growing number of advanced distributed denial of service 
(DDoS) attacks make acquaintance management potentially end up with an 
unreliable CIDN acquaintance list, resulting in low decision accuracy. This paper 
proposes an acquaintance management algorithm based on multi-class risk-cost 
analysis and merge-sort selection methods. The algorithm implements merge risk-
ordered selection to reduce computation complexity. The simulation result showed 
the reliability of CIDN in reducing the acquaintance selection processing time 
decreased and increasing the decision accuracy. 
Keywords: acquaintance selection; collaborative; denial of service; intrusion detection; 
risk analysis. 




An intrusion detection system (IDS) is a technology that detects the existence of 
computer intrusions [1]. It is an essential part of the defensive system in network 
security. The detection system implements a signature based or anomaly based 
detection method. The capability of IDS in detection, prevention, and response 
capability has been investigated in Refs. [2,3]. However, with the growing 
number of advanced attacks, attacks are getting harder to detect. One of the 
reasons is that a single IDS has limited resources and knowledge to detect all 
attacks [4], especially large, coordinated botnet attacks [5].  
A proposal to effectively resolve this problem is by implementing a collaborative 
intrusion detection network (CIDN), i.e., a collaboration framework among IDSs. 
CIDNs are widely implemented and have been studied in cloud computing [6], 
IoT [7,8], blockchain [9], and big data [10]. The purpose of these studies was to 
gain knowledge, information, and consultation among IDSs to improve IDS 
performance. Consultation based CIDN is a type of collaboration by sending 
consultation requests of observed data to be detected by the CIDN in order to 
improve the overall detection accuracy of the CIDN. The acquaintance 
management algorithm is a vital function of the framework. It selects the set of 
IDS that leads to the lowest overall risk-cost by evaluating the trustworthiness of 
each available IDS [11]. A greedy-selection-sort based algorithm was introduced 
in [4,12] to optimize the selection process instead of brute-force based selection. 
It uses a binary-based risk-cost case as the metric for trustworthiness in the 
selection process. 
However, the greedy-selection-sort-based acquaintance management algorithm 
requires a relatively long acquaintance selection time when there is a large 
candidate list. This is because the computational complexity of the algorithm is 
𝑂(𝑛 ) in a worst-case scenario and on average takes 𝑇(𝑛 ∗ 𝑙) running time. 
Moreover, our previous study [11] has shown that the use of a binary-based risk-
cost analysis may produce an inaccurate risk-cost for multi-class detection cases, 
where the DDoS attack consists of more than one botnet or class of attack. This 
can lead to an unreliable set of selected collaborators, resulting in lower decision 
accuracy. 
This research proposes an acquaintance management algorithm based on multi-
class risk-cost analysis to reduce the acquaintance selection time and improve the 
accuracy of the risk-cost estimation. The proposed acquaintance management 
algorithm implements an ordered risk-cost approach to reduce its complexity. 
The trustworthiness of an IDS is evaluated by a multi-class risk-cost analysis to 
obtain an accurate risk-cost estimation. The effectiveness of the proposed 
acquaintance management algorithm was evaluated using the decision accuracy 
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metric. The result showed that our algorithm produces a more effective set of 
acquaintances with higher decision accuracy in less selection time compared to a 
comparative state-of-the-art algorithm. 
This paper presents the following contributions. Firstly, this research developed 
a complete framework to simulate the process of a consultation-based CIDN that 
can simulate the flow of the detection process, collaboration updating, the 
selection process, and the feedback aggregation decision of the CIDN in order to 
improve its detection and classification accuracy. Secondly, this research 
proposes an acquaintance management algorithm that optimally selects a set of 
an acquaintances in less selection processing time with higher decision accuracy. 
Thirdly, this research developed a risk-cost analysis method based on multi IDS 
feedback by considering all possible consequences, including from wrong 
response decisions. 
2 Related Work 
A collaborative intrusion detection network (CIDN) is an overlay network that 
connects IDSs so that they can exchange information [4]. The collaboration 
works in three modes, i.e., information, knowledge, and consultation. In 
information mode, each IDS shares information about the detection result, such 
as alerts [13] and IP level security logs for a higher prediction ratio in proactive 
detection [14]. In knowledge mode, the new knowledge is shared among IDSs, 
such as new clusters [15] and new attack behaviors [16]. In consultation mode, 
the collaboration is done by sending consultation messages when the IDS has less 
confidence in the detection prediction, such as in [4]. The collaboration can be 
implemented in peer-to-peer [17], concentrated [18], and distributed [19] 
topologies.  
In consultation-based CIDNs there are several important challenges in 
constructing an effective collaboration, such as collaboration management [20], 
incentive-based resource management [21, 22], malicious node detection [23,24], 
and consultation-request timing scenario [25]. The collaboration management 
algorithm selects a set of acquaintance IDS, where the trustworthiness can be 
estimated by several proposed evaluation parameters, such as satisfaction value 
[26], intrusion sensitivity [27], and risk-cost [4,11,28].  
In risk-cost-based collaboration management, the IDS selects a set of 
acquaintances, resulting in the lowest overall risk-cost of the detection decision. 
Ref. [29] started consultation-based IDN research by trust-management to 
evaluate the behavior of IDN members. Its purpose is to select which IDS to 
collaborate with in order to improve the accuracy of attack detection. However, 
this study did not consider the possibility of rapid behavioral change as in 
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malicious insider attacks. Ref. [28] proposed a consultation-based collaboration 
by aggregating IDS detection feedback. Risk-cost analysis based on IDS output 
was introduced to measure the trustworthiness of the IDS. In this case, an agent 
manager sends a consultation request to some IDS detection agents. This was 
studied further in Ref. [12], through collaboration management that not only 
selects but also manages the relationship in the CIDN. A greedy-selection-sort-
based acquaintance management algorithm and binary risk-cost analysis  were 
proposed, resulting in a relatively long acquaintance selection time when there is 
a large candidate list. This method potentially produces low decision accuracy 
when used in multi-botnet attacks, as the batch of consultation messages may 
consist of multi-class attacks. A recent study [11], proposed a multi-class risk-
cost analysis, which leads to higher decision accuracy for multi-class attacks. 
3 System Architecture 
3.1 CIDN framework 
Suppose there is an environment consisting of 𝑖 number of IDS, 𝐼𝐷𝑁 =
{𝐼𝐷𝑆 , 𝐼𝐷𝑆 , 𝐼𝐷𝑆 , … , 𝐼𝐷𝑆 }, parameterized by its performance, 𝐼𝐷𝑆 =
 [𝐹𝑃, 𝐹𝑁, 𝐹𝑜𝑇𝑃]. Viewed from a CIDN point of view there are: IDS_caller 
(𝐼𝐷𝑆 ∈ 𝐼𝐷𝑁), the IDS in search of acquaintance, and several called_IDS (𝐼𝐷𝑆 ∈
𝐼𝐷𝑁; 𝑠 ≠ 𝑗), IDSs other than 𝐼𝐷𝑆 , that can potentially become 𝐼𝐷𝑆  
acquaintances. The roles of 𝐼𝐷𝑆  and 𝐼𝐷𝑆  are interchangeable, depending on the 
updating period of each IDS. From the 𝐼𝐷𝑆  point of view, the available 𝐼𝐷𝑆  that 
can collaborate with 𝐼𝐷𝑆  first enter the probation list of 𝐼𝐷𝑆 , 𝑃 =
{𝑝 , 𝑝 , 𝑝 , … 𝑝 }, 𝑃 ⊆ 𝐼𝐷𝑁 , with 𝑃  = {𝐼𝐷𝑁}/𝐼𝐷𝑆 .  
Acquaintance management in 𝐼𝐷𝑆  evaluates the trustworthiness of each 𝐼𝐷𝑆  in 
𝑃 . The goal is to select the set of 𝐼𝐷𝑆  that has the lowest risk-cost from the 
acquaintance list. When the updating period arrives, the trustworthiness of 𝐼𝐷𝑆  
is evaluated by sending random test data 𝑋 = {𝑥 , 𝑥 , 𝑥 , … , 𝑥 }, where 𝑥 is 
traffic data, to 𝑃 . Each 𝐼𝐷𝑆  in 𝑃  then observes 𝑋  with its detection method. 
The detection result 𝑍  from each 𝐼𝐷𝑆  is then sent back to 𝐼𝐷𝑆 . Based on a set 
of feedback items 𝑈 = {𝑍 , 𝑍 , 𝑍 , … , 𝑍 } from 𝑃 , the 𝐼𝐷𝑆  evaluates the 
detection performance (𝐻, 𝐹, 𝐹𝑜𝑇𝑃) of each 𝐼𝐷𝑆 . When the performance 
satisfies the 𝐼𝐷𝑆  performance threshold, the 𝐼𝐷𝑆  is moved to candidate list 𝐶 =
{𝑐 , 𝑐 , 𝑐 , . . . , 𝑐 }, 𝐶 ⊆ 𝑃 .  
However, not all IDS listed in 𝐶  will be included in the collaboration, because 
the collaboration is looking for the lowest overall risk-cost of collaboration. Thus, 
𝐼𝐷𝑆  will be considered an acquaintance and included in acquaintance list 𝐴 =
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{ 𝑎 , 𝑎 , 𝑎 , . . . , 𝑎 }; 𝐴 ⊆ 𝐶  when 𝐼𝐷𝑆  contributes to achieving the lowest 
overall risk-cost of acquaintance list 𝑅(𝐴). An illustration of this process is 










Figure 1 CIDN acquaintance selection process. 
The collaboration in consultation-based CIDN is manifested in the consultation 
request of observed suspect data 𝑋 , i.e the. message 𝐶𝑅 𝑋  from 
𝐼𝐷𝑆  to 𝐼𝐷𝑆  in acquaintance list 𝐴 . The messages communicated among CIDNs 
are shown in Table 1. The sending of consultation requests is not carried out on 
every observed data but based on the uncertainty of the 𝐼𝐷𝑆  classification 
algorithm output. The classification output of any IDS can be analyzed from a 
confusion matrix such as in Figure 2.  
Table 1 Messages exchanged between IDS. 
Messages Definition 
𝑱𝒐𝒊𝒏𝒓𝒆𝒒𝒖𝒆𝒔𝒕 Request from new 𝐼𝐷  to 𝐼𝐷𝑆  to collaborate with 
𝑿𝒕𝒆𝒔𝒕 Test data sent from 𝐼𝐷𝑆  to 𝐼𝐷𝑆  
𝑼𝒕𝒆𝒔𝒕 Detection reply of 𝑋  from acquaintances to 𝐼𝐷𝑆  
𝑪𝑹𝑿𝒔𝒖𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒄𝒕) Observed data sent from 𝐼𝐷𝑆  to its acquaintances 
𝑪𝑭(𝑼𝒔𝒖𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒄𝒕) Detection feedback of 𝑋  sent from acquaintances to 𝐼𝐷𝑆  
The collaboration framework carries out four major functions. The first is 
detection and classification, including feature extraction by the use of feature 
selection and linear expansion; the second is the acquaintance management; the 
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third is trust and consultation management; and the final function is making the 
feedback aggregation decision. The proposed framework is depicted in Figure 3. 
 Predicted 
Actual  Normal Attack A Attack B 
Normal 𝑇𝑁 𝐹𝑃 𝐹𝑃 
Attack A 𝐹𝑁 𝑇𝑃 𝐹𝑜𝑇𝑃 
Attack B 𝐹𝑁 𝐹𝑜𝑇𝑃 𝑇𝑃 
 
























Figure 3 The framework of the proposed consultation-
based CIDN model. 
3.2 Acquaintance Management Algorithm 
After receiving feedback items 𝑈  from 𝑃, the 𝐼𝐷𝑆  selects the candidate list 
by evaluating the feedback performance of 𝑍  from each 𝐼𝐷𝑆 . From the available 
candidate list, acquaintance selection is done by evaluating the 𝐼𝐷𝑆  in the 
candidate list that result in the lowest overall risk-cost. The overall risk-cost is 
estimated from the feedbacks risk-cost and the maintenance risk-cost.  
This research proposes an acquaintance management algorithm to evaluate the 
overall risk-cost of the acquaintance list. The acquaintances are selected in a 
sequence of 𝐼𝐷𝑆 , starting from the one with the lowest risk-cost 𝑅(𝑍 ). The 
algorithm constructs the sequence by implementing a merge-sort method, which 
on average yields 𝑂(𝑛 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑛) computation complexity. The present research 
developed the algorithm based on the research in [30], which was proved capable 
of providing high-quality candidates. The pseudo-code of the algorithm is 
depicted in Algorithm 1. 
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This research implements a feedback risk-cost analysis based on our previous 
research [11]. The analysis is carried out by considering the risk-cost of all 
consequence probabilities of the decision (δ) taken by 𝐼𝐷𝑆  when given a set of 
𝑈  feedback items from CIDN. The risk-cost value can be seen as the estimated 
risk of cost or loss consequences when the system takes any decision according 
to observed traffic such as in Eq. (1). When the 𝑈  input is a set of feedback, the 
risk value will depend on the marginal value of the parameters. 
 𝑅(𝛿) = (𝑅(𝑥 = 𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙) + 𝑅(𝛿|𝑥 = 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘 ) (1) 
Algorithm 1. Acquaintance Management 
1. at update event do 
2. // send random 𝑋  to 𝑃  
3. // receives 𝑈 = {𝑍 } from 𝐼𝐷𝑆 𝜖 𝑃 
4. for all 𝐼𝐷𝑆  𝜖 𝑃 do 
5. if 𝑡 >  𝑡  then 
6. 𝑃 ← 𝑃 \ 𝐼𝐷𝑆  
7. if 𝐻 > 𝐻  and 𝐹 > 𝐹  then 
8. 𝐶 ← 𝐶 ⋃ 𝐼𝐷𝑆  
9. end if 
10. end if 
11. end for  
12. 𝐴 ← { } 
13. for all 𝐼𝐷𝑆  𝜖 𝐶 do 
14. 𝑅 ← 𝑅(𝑍 ) 
15. end for 
16. [𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥] ← 𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑡(𝑅 ) 
17. 𝐶′ ← Sort 𝐼𝐷𝑆  𝜖 𝐶  according to 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥  
18. for 𝑖 = 1 to |𝐶′| do 
19. 𝐴 ← 𝐴 ⋃ 𝐼𝐷𝑆   
20. if 𝑅 (𝐴) < 𝑇 then 
21. 𝑇 ← 𝑅 (𝐴) 
22. 𝑙 = |𝐴| 
23. if 𝑙 = 𝑙  then 
24. 𝑗 = |𝐶 | + 1 
25. end if 
26. else  
27. 𝐴 ← 𝐴 \ 𝐼𝐷𝑆   
28. end if 
29. end for 
30. return 𝐴 
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The parameter 𝑝 = 𝑃[𝑋 = 1] is the prior probability of an attack happening in 
the IDS. Decision 𝛿 can be in the form of a no_response when no attack is 
detected (normal traffic) or a response when an attack is detected. The risk 
analysis applies the product to several feedback items, |𝐴|, from the IDS in the 
acquaintance list {𝐴}. The risk-cost analysis follows the consequences from all 
possible decisions (δ), as shown in Figure 4.  
 
Figure 4 The decision tree of the expected risk-cost from all 
possible decisions (𝛿). 
From each feedback 𝑍𝑖, the analysis gets information from a confusion matrix as 
shown in Figure 2. The loss consequence occurs in two possible response 
decisions, i.e. no_response and wrong_response, when intrusion occurs. A loss 
consequence of a no_response decision occurs when the detector output is a false 
negative (𝐹𝑁). A loss consequence of a wrong_response decision occurs when 
the attack is wrongly classified by the IDS so that the wrong_response is not able 
to stop the attack. This happens when the detector output is in false on true 
positive (𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒𝑇𝑃) condition. A cost consequence occurs when the detector 
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output is in false positive (𝐹𝑃) or true positive (𝑇𝑃) condition. However, this 
research only considered the cost consequence of false positive condition 
responses. The risk-cost formula for all consequences is listed in Table 2. 
Table 2 Expected risk-cost consequences of the detection output. 
Detector Real 
condition 
Expected risk-cost decision 
No Response Response 
NoAlarm No intrusion 0 𝐶 ∗ 𝐹𝑁 = 𝐶(((1 − 𝐹)(1 − 𝑝)) 
Intrusion 𝐿((1 − 𝐻)𝑝) 𝐿((1 − 𝐻)𝑝 ∗ 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒𝐹𝑁/𝐹𝑁) 
Alarm No intrusion 0 𝐶 ∗ 𝐹𝑃 = 𝐶(𝐹(1 − 𝑝)) 
Intrusion 𝐿(𝐻 ∗ 𝑝) 𝐿(𝐻 ∗ 𝑝 ∗ 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒𝑇𝑃/𝑇𝑃) 
 





































with 𝛼 = {0;    𝑖𝑓 𝑧 = 0 (𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙)  1;    𝑖𝑓 𝑧 ≠ 0 (𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘)  
In CIDN, the overall risk-cost is influenced by two concerns. Firstly, the 
acquaintance risk-cost, which is the risk-cost of decisions from the obtained 
acquaintance list feedback, 𝑅(𝑈(𝐴) = 𝑅(𝐴). Secondly, the risk-cost due to the 
maintenance of collaboration. The value of the maintenance risk-cost can be seen 
from the number of resources allocated for the collaboration. The greater the 
number of collaborators, the more resources will be allocated for the computation 
and communication resources. For this reason, the risk-cost value of the 
maintenance process is formulated as a function of acquaintance list size (|𝐴|). 
Thus, the total risk-cost is obtained by summing the CIDN feedback risk-cost and 
the maintenance risk-cost as follows: 
 𝑅 = 𝑅(𝐴) + (|𝐴| ∗ 𝜃 (3) 
4 Result and Analysis 
This research applied supervised learning in the IDS detection method. The 
complete feature selection and normal profile generation processes are presented 
in [31] and [32]. The KDD Cup 99 dataset from [33] was applied to evaluate 
our model. For the learning phase, the DDoS dataset from KDD Cup 99 
kddcup.data_10_percent was used as the basis for generating training data 𝑋. 𝑇𝑟. 
The DDoS dataset in kddcup_corrected was then used as the basis for testing 
The Multi-Class Risk-Cost Analysis for CIDN 
 
1199 
dataset 𝑋. 𝑇𝑠, which was randomly generated in the testing phase. The simulation 
parameters are shown in Table 3. 
Table 1 Simulation parameters. 
Parameter Value 
𝒍𝒎𝒊𝒏 1 







𝑿𝒕𝒆𝒔𝒕 composition Random 
𝜽 0.001 
 
A comparison between the proposed acquaintance management and a greedy-
selection-sort algorithm based on [12] was conducted in the analysis phase. The 
comparison was done in terms of selection time, size of the acquaintance list |𝐴|, 
and accuracy of the feedback aggregation decision of acquaintance feedback 
(𝑓 (𝑈)). The simulations were run within the scope of discrete event simulation 
with time parameter 𝑡 symbolizing an activity [34].  
The CIDN was modeled as IDS_caller (𝐼𝐷𝑆 ) and called_IDS (𝐼𝐷𝑆 ), where each 
IDS was parameterized by FP, FN and FoTP. For the analysis of the acquaintance 
management algorithm, 100 called_IDS were generated in the IDN set to 
represent the IDN environment. The analysis was done in four environments, i.e. 
𝐼𝐷𝑁 = [< 2%, < 2%, < 3%], 𝐼𝐷𝑁 = [< 2%, < 5%, 3 ≤ 𝐹𝑜𝑇𝑃 < 6%], 
𝐼𝐷𝑁 = [< 2%, < 5%, 6 ≤ 𝐹𝑜𝑇𝑃 < 9%], and 𝐼𝐷𝑁 = [< 2%, < 5%, ≥ 9%]. 
An IDS_caller was then generated for each environment, which was 
parameterized by 𝐼𝐷𝑆 = [𝐹𝑃 < 2, 𝐹𝑁 < 5, 𝐹𝑜𝑇𝑃 < 10]. The analysis was 
done on the average of all IDS acquaintance management outputs. 
4.1 Processing Time 
The simulation result showed that the selection time of the proposed acquaintance 
management algorithm was lower than comparison [12]. This is in accordance 
with the algorithm’s complexity of 𝑂(𝑛 + 𝑛 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑛 + 𝑛) = 𝑂(𝑛 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑛)  for 
the proposed algorithm, compared to 𝑂 𝑛
( )
= 𝑂(𝑛 ) for comparison. In the 
simulated scenario, the minimum number of acquaintances (𝑙  ) increased 
along with the size of the candidate list (𝑙 < 𝑛). With the proposed algorithm, 
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the minimum number of acquaintances (𝑙 ) did not affect the selection 
processing time. This is because the selection iteration is executed only once. The 
comparison is shown in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5 Acquaintance selection processing time 
comparison. 
4.2 The Influence of Environmental Performance 
In a CIDN environment with high classification performance such as 𝐼𝐷𝑁  there 
are more candidates and more combination options in acquaintance selection. 
Thus, the selection does not require too many members to achieve a low risk-cost 
value or high CIDN decision accuracy. However, in an environment with worse 
performance, such as 𝐼𝐷𝑁  or 𝐼𝐷𝑁 , CIDN needs more 𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑_𝐼𝐷𝑆 in the 
acquaintance list to gain high decision accuracy. The number of candidates in the 
candidate list also influences the obtained acquaintance list performance.  
A smaller candidate list size leads to limited 𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑_𝐼𝐷𝑆 options that can be 
collaborated with to improve CIDN performance. Thus, it decreases the 
acquaintance list size and the CIDN feedback decision accuracy, for example in 
𝐼𝐷𝑁 . The average acquaintance list size derived for every environment can be 
seen in Figure 6 where Alg. YP is the proposed algorithm and Alg. CF is 
comparison. The result is in line with the theoretical analysis discussed in the next 
section. 




Figure 6 Average acquaintance list size comparison. 
From the accuracy performance result, the proposed acquaintance algorithm was 
able to provide an acquaintance list that produced better feedback decision 
accuracy than comparison. This is because the risk-cost analysis used in the 
proposed algorithm can accurately distinguish 𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑_𝐼𝐷𝑆 trustworthiness. From 
the generated 100 IDS in the IDN set, the size of the probation and candidate list 
produced by both algorithms were the same in every scenario. However, as the 
risk-cost analysis from the proposed algorithm provided a more accurate 
estimation of risk-cost, the acquaintance list feedback decision accuracy was 
higher. This can be seen in the case example of feedback decision accuracy in 
every environment, as shown in Figure 7.  
However, the proposed algorithm still had a drawback. The memory used in the 
selection process was higher because of the merge-sort method, which produces 
space complexity 𝑂(𝑛), i.e., higher than 𝑂(1) for comparison. The higher 
number of acquaintance size also produces a higher number of consultation 
messages, which possibly burdens the network. 
 
IDN_1 IDN_2 IDN_3 IDN_4
Alg. CF 1.952380952 1.857142857 2.419354839 2
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Figure 7 Average acquaintance list accuracy comparison. 
4.3 Theoretical Analysis 
4.3.1 CIDN Decision Accuracy 
Lemma: 
If 𝑅(𝑦) is a risk-cost value based on a stand-alone IDS decision 𝑦, and 𝑅(𝐴) 
is a risk-cost value based on feedback 𝑦  from a group of |𝐴| IDS in CIDN, 
then 𝑅(𝑦) > 𝑅(𝐴). 
Proof: 
From input data 𝑋 = {𝑥 , 𝑥 , 𝑥 , … , 𝑥 }, a stand-alone IDS detects and classifies 
X into 𝑌 = {𝑦 , 𝑦 , 𝑦 , … , 𝑦 }. It has the probability of accurately classifying 𝑋 











 𝑑  (4) 
In a CIDN with |A| number of acquaintances, each data 𝑥  from 𝑋 = {𝑥 ,
𝑥 , 𝑥 , … , 𝑥 } will be sent to the acquaintances. Thus, the IDS will receive a set 
of feedback items 𝑈 = {𝑍 , 𝑍 , 𝑍 , … , 𝑍 }, with 𝑍 = {𝑧 , 𝑧 , 𝑧 , … , 𝑧 } and 𝑧  is 
the feedback from 𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑_𝐼𝐷𝑆  for data 𝑥 . From the incoming data 𝑍  as the 
group of |A| data from the acquaintance list, the analysis is done on 𝑈 by the use 
of the central limit theorem. From the statistical analysis on every data 𝑍 , i.e., 
IDN_1 IDN_2 IDN_3 IDN_4
Alg. CF 99.2 97.9 97.6 95.9
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𝑦 = 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛(𝑍 ), it constructs a C1 profile. Then, it has (µ( )𝐶1, | | 𝜎  ( )𝐶1) 
as C1 statistical profile. Thus, the probability of accurately classifying 𝑋 in class 









































From 𝑃 and 𝑄 analysis, the probability of accurately classifying X into C1 from 
CIDN decision (𝑄) is higher than from a stand-alone IDS (𝑃) value. The 𝑄 value 
is classification accuracy, which is defined as 𝐴𝑐𝑐 =
( )
| |
. A higher 𝑄 value 
means that the hit rate in CIDN is higher (𝐻 is directly proportional to 𝑇𝑃) and 
the false rate is lower (𝐹 is inversely proportional to 𝑇𝑁). Thus, if 𝑄 > 𝑃, then 
𝑅(𝐴) < 𝑅(𝑦), as shown by Eq. (2). 
4.3.2 Acquaintance Management 
Lemma: 
If 𝑅(𝑧 ) is the risk-cost value based on the IDS_caller  decision output, 𝑅(𝑧 ) 
is the risk-cost value based on feedback 𝑧  from 𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑_𝐼𝐷𝑆 , and 𝑅(𝑧 ) is the 
risk-cost value based on feedback 𝑧  from 𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑_𝐼𝐷𝑆 , where 𝑅(𝑧 ) <  𝑅(𝑧 ), 
then the risk-cost from CIDN acquaintance {𝐴 } = {𝑧 , 𝑧 ) is lower than from 
acquaintance {𝐴 } = {𝑧 , 𝑧 }; 𝑅(𝐴 ) < 𝑅(𝐴 ).  
Proof: 
Suppose, a CIDN with |A| number of acquaintances applies a feedback 
aggregation decision 𝛿 = 𝐼(𝑓 (𝑥) +  𝑓 (𝑥) + 𝑓 (𝑥)+ . . . +𝑓| |(𝑥)), with 𝑓 (𝑥) is 
the classification function of 𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑_𝐼𝐷𝑆  in CIDN. Each 𝑓  will have a 
classification error of 𝑒(𝑓 (𝑥)), which aligns with risk-cost value (𝑧 ) according 
to Eq. (2). Then, decision function 𝛿 will produce decision error 𝑒 = 𝐼(𝛿 ≠ 𝑦) if 
𝐸 = 𝐼(𝑒(𝑓 (𝑥)) +  𝑒(𝑓 (𝑥)) +  𝑒(𝑓 (𝑥))+ . . . +𝑒(𝑓 (𝑥)) >  𝑇 ), where 𝑇  is the 
error threshold.  
For this reason, heuristic analysis selects 𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑_𝐼𝐷𝑆 , which has a lower 
𝑒(𝑓 (𝑥)) and produces a lower value of 𝐸. Suppose there are two 𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑_𝐼𝐷𝑆 in 
candidate list 𝐶 = {𝐼𝐷𝑆 , 𝐼𝐷𝑆 }. From Bayes theorem for 𝑓  and 𝑓 , if  𝑃 (𝑓 ) =
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1204 
𝑃(𝑒|𝑓 ) is the probability of error in 𝑓  and 𝑃 (𝑓 ) = 𝑃(𝑒|𝑓 ) is the one in 𝑓 , 
then the probability of error Eqs. (6-8) are as follows: 
 𝑃(𝑓 ) = 𝑃(𝑒 ∩ 𝑓 )/𝑃(𝑓 ) (6) 
 𝑃(𝑓 ) = 𝑃(𝑒 ∩ 𝑓 )/𝑃(𝑓 ) (7) 
 𝑃(𝑒) = 𝑃(𝑒 ∩ 𝑓 ) + 𝑃(𝑒 ∩ 𝑓 ) = 𝑃(𝑓 )𝑃(𝑓 ) + 𝑃(𝑓 )𝑃(𝑓 ) (8) 
The probabilities of any error occurring in 𝑓  and 𝑓  are: 
 𝑃(𝑓 |𝑒) = 𝑃(𝑒|𝑓 )𝑃(𝑓 )/𝑃(𝑒) (9) 
 𝑃(𝑓 |𝑒) = 𝑃(𝑒|𝑓 )𝑃(𝑓 )/𝑃(𝑒) (10) 
 
Heuristically, it is clear that if 𝑃(𝑓 ) >  𝑃(𝑓 ), then 𝑃(𝑒) > 𝑃(𝑒). By using a 
sorting method in acquaintance selection, a lower 𝑒(𝑓 (𝑥)) value will result in a 
lower probability of aggregation decision error 𝑃 (𝛿). Thus, it will have a lower 
risk-cost 𝑅(𝐴). In the case of 𝑅(𝑧 ) <  𝑅(𝑧 ), the result has 𝑅(𝐴 ) < 𝑅(𝐴 ). 
5 Conclusion and Future Work 
The proposed acquaintance management algorithm utilizes a sequence of sorted 
risk-cost candidates in the acquaintance selection process. Compared to a state-
of-the-art algorithm, the proposed algorithm provides a reduced selection 
processing time and higher CIDN decision accuracy. In the proposed algorithm, 
the overall risk-cost value is estimated only in one iteration during the 
acquaintance selection process. This reduces the algorithm’s computation 
complexity to 𝑂 (𝑛 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑛), i.e., lower than 𝑂 (𝑛 ) for the comparative algorithm. 
By using our previous risk-cost analysis in the proposed algorithm, it was proven 
to be able to select the acquaintance list that leads to the lowest overall risk-cost 
value and to a 2.7 percent higher CIDN decision accuracy on average. However, 
as a consequence of the implementation of merge-sort, the space complexity of 
the algorithm is higher (𝑂(𝑛)) compared to that of the comparative algorithm 
(𝑂(1)). 
For a better understanding of CIDN, the necessity of autonomous decision-
making in CIDN will be investigated further in a future study by the use of a 
cooperative multi-agent model. Also, the necessity of resource management 
research, which directly concerns consultation management and incentives for 
collaboration, will be part of our future research. 
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